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ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES
AND THE
INVESTMENT
CREDIT
In 196a Congress enacted the investment tax credit to stimulate industry's
investment in capital assets. The Accounting Principles Board, in its Opinion No. 2, first decided that the credit,
for a c c o u n t i n g purposes, should b e
spread over the life of the related property rather than being all taken into
income the year the property was purchased. A year and a half later Opinion
No. 4 was issued, stating that this
spreading or "deferral" method was still
the preferred method, but that the current income or so-called "flow-through"
method was also acceptable. Then, in
September 1967, the Board published
the exposure draft of an Opinion on accounting for income taxes, the investment credit portion of which called for
reversion to the deferral-only position.
However, in December the Board set
aside that portion for further study,
leaving the alternatives still open.
Your editors have felt that it might
be useful to query Mr. Queen an about
this somewhat perplexing sequence of
events, and at the same time to gain
further insight about how accounting
thought develops.
Interviewer: Mr. Queenan, throughout
the more than five years since the in-
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vestment credit was enacted, when Mr.
Powell was on the A P B and then you,
Haskins & Sells has been an energetic
leader of the minority group 011 the
Board that said "flow-through" is the
proper accounting method. Would you
say this action by the Board in setting
aside the deferral-only proposal is a
victory for our H&S position?
M r . Q u e e n a n : No, I don't think I
would. The majority of the Board still
favors deferral. On the other hand most
of the thousand corporation executives
and practitioners, and many of the educators, who wrote to the Board about
the matter favor flow-through. So the
question is still entirely undecided.
But I don't like the connotation of
the word "victory." I don't think you
should picture this as two opposing
groups battling to a decision. That is
not how accounting thought moves forward, at least not in my judgment.
How did the Finn come to adopt its
position?
We spent a great deal of time analyzing
all of its aspects. In the beginning, the
law required that the credit be deducted from the cost of the property
for figuring depreciation, so with the
corporation tax rate at 52 per cent, a
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little over half of the credit eventually
went back to the government. W e
agreed this half should be deferred, but
not the other half which the company
kept free and clear—without necessity
to take further action or to incur additional cost.
We looked at this other half as it
fitted into the existing framework of
accounting concepts. We saw it quite
simply as a reduction in income tax expense. This, to us, was an indisputable
business fact. And as a matter of fact,
most of those favoring deferral now
agree. They used to view it essentially
as a reduction in cost of the property,
but now they only say it is related to
the property and its use.
Why did they change?
I don't know that the reasons are clearcut. T h e fact t h a t the tax law was
changed in 1964 to provide that the
credit was not to reduce the basis of
the property probably had something
to do with it. In our view, of course,
that change made the entire amount of
the investment credit a reduction of
tax expense, not just half of it.
Now, under present accounting concepts, revenue, or a reduction in expense, is recognized—that is, picked up

in income—when no further action need
be taken or further cost incurred in
realizing it—when the company has an
unconditional right to it. The investment credit is realized as soon as there
are current revenues that give rise to
the tax expense that the investment
credit reduces. So there is no reason,
within the accounting framework, to
defer it.
Then how do the proponents of the
deferral method support their position?
Well now, I don't know that it's fair
to them for me to be explaining their
position. However, I can express my
difficulty with it. They seem to depend
heavily on something they say is an
accepted concept: that income results
from the use of property, not from its
acquisition. With this idea in mind,
they say that the investment credit—
which they thus classify as income—is
primarily associated with the property
acquired, and that it should therefore
be allocated to the periods in which the
property is used.
That seems like a rather plausible position to take.
Oh, it does have an appeal, and it did
particularly when the argument was
that the credit was a reduction in the

cost of the property. But when you
examine it, it just doesn't hold water.
First, I think the idea that "use rather
than acquisition of property produces
income" is a generalization or an observation relating to revenue recognition, r a t h e r t h a n expense reduction.
Second, the idea that the credit is associated with the property is not pertinent, in our view. Many factors are
associated with the use of assets—the
amount of maintenance costs, for example—but nobody has suggested that
such costs be charged to income in proportion to depreciation charges.
Third, it is quite a strained view to
look on the credit as "income" from
the government. But even if it were
"income," then it seems inescapable
that it would have to be considered as
earned when there had been compliance with the statutory provisions. Except for the remote possibility that
there might be a significant amount of
recapture, compliance with the statutory provisions, in most cases, is immediate. So the reason for deferral would
not exist.
These are technical objections. But
something that more deeply concerns
me is the philosophy behind this de-
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ferral position. I can only see in it a
belief that the tax reductions that arise
from the investment credit should be
leveled, that there is something inherently wrong in the bunching of the
credit that can occur when capital asset
purchases are higher in some years than
in others. I find this philosophy in a
number of places in the argument made
for deferral. For instance, one stated
objection to flow-through is that it
may result in increasing or decreasing
net income solely by reason of the
timing of acquisitions. Another is that
management may time their acquisitions — and thus their credits — as a
matter of business policy. Also it is
feared that the recent increase in the
allowable amount of the credit will
even increase these fluctuations.
To me, this philosophy is absolutely
wrong. What the effects may be on net
income or on the pattern of earnings
does not furnish the starting point for
determining the accounting for a business fact. It is the other way round:
you account for business facts by their
natures and net income is the result of
the accounting for all of its components.
May I go back for a moment? When it
was evident in 1962 that the majority
of the Board wanted "deferral," why
did we persist in our position?
If you mean after Opinion No. 2 was
issued why didn't we recognize the
deferral method as the only generally
accepted practice as the Opinion required, that was because it quickly be-
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came overwhelmingly evident to us
that the flow-through method also was
widely accepted. The diversity of views
that had existed before the Opinion
was issued persisted, and the SEC said
it would accept flow-through.
It was not our belief t h a t t h e r e
should be alternative m e t h o d s . But
Weldon Powell, who was Board chairman at the time, could see no consensus
among the members, and there was no
basis in experience for general acceptance of either method alone. So he
favored going through an aging process
that might show us which one method
would gain general acceptance.
Now, if your question means why
didn't we remove our dissent from the
Opinion before it was published, then
I would say that to remove it would be
to undermine the whole structure. The
recording of dissent if it exists gives
credibility to the positions taken. After
all, if you believe your position is logical
and practicable, and no one has been
able to show you where you're wrong,
you can't just give in for the sake of
outward unanimity. When the Board
is split as widely as it was—and is—on
the investment credit, then it must
consider whether the matter it's working on is really ready for a definitive
answer.
It seems to me that being logical is a
matter of being reasonable, too, and it
might have been reasonable and logical
back in 1962 just to have accepted the
investment credit as a property cost re-

duction. After all, the main thing is
whether people understand it or not,
and that treatment seems eminently understandable, even if it doesn't fit into
the accounting framework. A red traffic
light means stop, but if we changed it
to blue and everyone agreed that meant
stop, what's the difference?
Well, as a matter of fact that's right, so
long as you make the stop lights blue
everywhere. But w h a t would more
likely happen is that you'd have blue
meaning stop at one intersection, but
then there would be some special reason for having orange at the next intersection, somebody else would want
yellow at the next, and so on. And
that's just the mix-up you'd have in
accounting if you tried to decide each
issue by itself.
W h e n t h e Accounting Principles
Board was formed in 1959 it was hoped
that an accounting framework could be
rebuilt that would avoid such situations. It was intended that the Board
would produce—through the findings of
research studies—a framework of basic
accounting principles, conventions,
postulates. Then as new types of business transactions or situations came
along, they could be analyzed for their
accounting characteristics and given
treatment that fitted in with the framework already established.
But apparently this hasn't happened?
No, it hasn't, at least not to the extent
that we had hoped. There are some
reasons for this that now seem obvious.

The manpower requirement, for one
thing, was great and the availability of
competent people with time to spend
on accounting research was small. This
s h o r t a g e exists to t h e p r e s e n t time.
Partly for this reason, some of the research studies have been undertaken
by accounting firms. Also, as it turned
out, we really didn't have in any one
place an inventory of accounting principles as they currently existed, and
this has had to be compiled. Then, too,
the B o a r d h a r d l y h a d t i m e to get
started on these basic studies when current a c c o u n t i n g questions raised b y
new business situations had to be answered. The investment credit was one
of these, but it has been followed by a
number of others — accounting for financing leases, for example — each of
which needed answering urgently, even
before the basic framework could be
established.
These problems of time—and money
—are ones that we can foresee solutions
to. The new Accounting Research Association of the AICPA, which all accounting linns are asked to support, is
a Step forward. However, there is a
problem that is less obvious but more
fundamental. And it presents a real
challenge. The Board has to find the
proper relationship between deductive
reasoning, which gives order and consistency to the structure of accounting
theories, and the testing of theories for
their practicability, which makes them
useful. T h e Institute research studies

published in the early 19605 dealt with
i m p o r t a n t matters, p u r s u e d l a r g e l y
t h r o u g h d e d u c t i v e research. But a
number of their conclusions have not
been fully tested in practice or comprehensively appraised in relation to
their usefulness. How to get this testing and appraisal is a pressing question.
Would you illustrate that?
The investment credit is an example
where the testing has resulted in difficulties. And somewhat the same thing
has just happened with the Board's pronouncement in 1966 that when a comp a n y issues c o n v e r t i b l e d e b t t h e r e
should be an accounting for the value
of the conversion privilege. That was
in paragraphs 8 and 9 of Opinion No.
10. The questions that have been raised
in the testing are so substantial that the
Board has withdrawn the effectiveness
of these paragraphs pending further
study.
I don't mean to imply by this that
the A P B should not take positions in
new areas, and certainly it should continue to push for a narrowing of differences. What I am saying is that to
avoid disorder the process must go forward at a pace which permits thoughtful consideration of intertwined complexities. I think this was done with
Opinion No. 8 on pension cost accounting. W e moved forward—not as far as
some would have liked, possibly—but
with consideration of all factors and
close attention to what would be useful
in practice. And I think that Opinion
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lias accomplished significant accounting improvement in a highly complex
area.
You mention "highly complex area."
Does solving accounting problems get
tougher the more complex the business
transaction?
Usually, because the more complex the
transaction, the more areas of accounting principles it is likely to affect. On
the other hand, the conceptual area involved may be relatively clear-cut and
yet prove the most difficult hurdle to
g e t o v e r — b e c a u s e the a c c o u n t i n g
framework I talked about before has
not been fully developed.
We must always remember that accounting is not an end in itself—it is
useful only when it is communicating
business information. And communicating means that the person on the receiving end has to understand what is
being told to him.
isn't that another of accounting's big
problems, trying to communicate with
people who don't understand accounting?
Yes it is. There are so many levels of
understanding and such a diversity of
needs: those of the "average" stockholder, the banker, the financial analyst,
the management accountant. Take the
investment credit again. Under the
flow-through method there is no question that a company's income is going
to be affected by the ups and downs of
the amounts of credit to which it is
entitled. And the person who reads only
the net income line in the income statement is going to suppose the ups were
good years and downs were bad years.
On the other hand, under the deferral
method, that same person is going to
see income recorded in future years
that really has no relation to operations
of those years.
I think we have always gone on the
presumption that the responsible
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reader of financial statements can be
properly charged with reading them in
total. Now, maybe we should be easing
away from this presumption, but in
any e v e n t , our e f f o r t s s h o u l d be
directed toward greater clarity in accounting presentations. There is also
much we can do toward explaining accounting matters to non-accountants, If
we do this with enthusiasm we can
accomplish a great deal.
But will there ever be an answer for
the person who just won't read anything but the last line?
Oh, that may be possible. We have of
recent years been greatly preoccupied
with measuring income. This is where
our most useful service has seemed to
be, just as fifty years ago measuring
balance sheet values seemed most important. It is quite conceivable to me
that we could, however, in the evolution of our goals, turn to measuring
earning power—a trend line of income
rather than income by itself, within
stated limits and specified reliability,
of course. That could give the "average" stockholder a useful figure on
one line.
How far in the future might that be?
Well, I'd say still pretty far. But it is
illustrative of the wide future accounting has. That is why we should not find
ourselves oppressed by single issues
like the investment credit that seem
difficult to solve. For every such question that comes before the Board there
are hundreds that are being answered
quietly and effectively by companies
and their accountants within the framework of concepts that have already
been established.
I think we should remind ourselves
that our profession has undertaken a
very major responsibility in our social
and economic structure. Recognizing
that, we should expect the issues we
deal with to be big ones, too.

